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EXPLAINING THE SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: THE








The paper presents a picture of the spatial location of the U.S. videogames industry as a broad range of clusters
of different sizes, none of them dominant, then uses a variety of qualitative evidence (including interview and
ethnographic) to illustrate a theory of how these variegated clusters have emerged and continue to persist, each
in their own right. In effect, our main findings are that videogame clusters do not operate as other creative
industry clusters, as described by the recent theories of buzz applied to other creative industries, nor by
conventional linkage arguments (either to suppliers or financier-distributors). Rather, the in-house nature of
the work, coupled with means of distantiated work, have allowed studios in clusters or outside of clusters to
continue to work at a distance from their preferred publishers, and vice versa. In the end, this might be ascribed
to the need to deal with lead creative human capital wherever it emerges and persists. The findings point out
the importance of maintaining a heterogeneous view of creative industries and their construction: both
organizationally, and spatially as clusters.
JEL - codes: O18, O14, -
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Explaining the Spatial Organization of Creative Industries: 




Many regions across countries have displayed an increased interest in creative 
industries as a possible engine of continued economic growth, enhanced welfare, ‘industrial’ 
revitalization and reduced inequality. Regions in countries from Japan and the United 
Kingdom to New Zealand and countries like Singapore are seeking to exploit or build their 
competitive advantages in these industries. In Scandinavia, it is suggested that the creative 
industries are conducive to job creation in ethnic communities. Creative industries consist of 
those sectors that serve consumer demands for amusement, ornamentation, social display, 
info-tainment, and so forth (Scott 1999, Caves 2000).1 The industries include the production 
of theater, newspapers, film, music, toys and games, and similar industries (Caves 2000, Scott 
2000, 1999, Pratt 2004a). Creative industries seem to have become a significant determinant 
in new formulas for regional development. The creative industries have proven to be 
instrumental for regional development in certain regions in the developed world. Studies 
estimate that those working in the creative industries constitute between 5-10% of the work 
force in the developed world (Pratt 2004b). In certain regions the creative industries provide a 
much higher share of the employment. According to Scott:  
 
“Cultural products of all sorts constitute a constantly increasing share of the 
output of modern capitalism, and cultural-products sectors represent some of the 
most dynamic growth industries in the world at the present time”.  (Scott 2000). 
The feature film industry in Hollywood and the computer games industry in 
California, are but two of the important examples that can be mentioned.  
                                                 
1 Thus we apply a definition close to that resembling cultural industries; that is a more narrow definition than 
one finds in Florida inspired work. We do not suggest that creative despite the name is necessary creative but in 
lack of better we maintain this concept. Cultural industries carry connotations of a strong cultural component 
which one does not necessarily find in all creative industries.   
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 Yet, as shown by others there are good reasons to be critical of the developmental power 
associated with the creative industries, particularly those affected by the power of conglomerates 
(Christopherson, 2006). In New York the film industry has been declining for years and the 
salaries or income for ‘creative’ employees and free agents are lower than that of comparative 
groups.  
The perceived importance of the creative industries has triggered extensive research in 
economic geography on the spatial organization of creative industries (Storper and Venables 
2004, Florida 2000; Pratt 2002a, 2004a, Scott 2000, Graber 2002, 2004). This academic field has 
itself been “creative”, buzzing with ideas and activities. While there is some uncertainty as to the 
explanatory power of this stream of research – that is, whether the cases studied should be seen 
as merely a collection of cases or building blocks in a larger theory - certain emerging patterns 
can be detected in large parts of the studies (for a discussion of the production and value chain-
oriented studies, see Vang and Lucas, 2006; Pratt 2004b). The bulk of studies suggests that 
creative industries tend to cluster in the largest metropolitan areas. This location bias, it is argued, 
allows for face-to-face and other tacit interactions, and a resulting buzz about new industry 
trends (Gibson and Kong 2005). Urban clusters provide access to traded and untraded localized 
assets; otherwise known as economic externalities.  The locational choice reflects how creative 
industries have been organized around inter- or intra-firm collaborative projects (Graber 2004, 
Scott 2004, Pratt 2002a, 2002b). Projects, it is argued, are an inter-organizational form that allow 
the flexible sourcing and deployment of the competencies needed for making creative products, 
and further, to do this under requirements that differ from project to project due to new trends, 
fashions or simply the need for experimenting. Projects are embedded in local clusters or 
“project ecologies”. Similar conclusions are reached by Scott with a transaction costs approach, 
by scholars drawing on the knowledge-based view of clusters (see for example Barthelt), and by 
the “Jacobs-inspired” research of Florida and other urban studies scholars. As argued by Gibbon 
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and Kong (2006) and Scott, the literature essentially understands creative industries by framing 
and emphasizing clustering processes in urban contexts. 
Yet, critical voices increasingly suggest that these ‘urban cluster´ approaches needs to be 
complemented with theories or approaches that more broadly explain the spatial organization of 
creative industries per se (Vang 2007), and that focus on the developmental powers of creative 
industries; and not just the clustering part of their spatial organization. This perspective suggests 
that the ‘urban cluster’ approach may only provide a partial explanation. In this paper we seek to 
contribute to this ‘new’ stream of research theoretically, by illustrating the explanatory gaps, and 
empirically, by a grounded study of the spatial organization of the US video games, which 
suggests how the gaps can be filled in. We aim at explaining not just the clustering processes but 
the spatial organization of the industry per se, where spatial organization refers to the distribution 
of firms across space (in this case within a nation) and their interaction.2 The study suggests that 
the spatial organization of some creative industries involves firms’ use of specific governance 
modes not accounted for in the literature (i.e. in-house capabilities [also known as ‘hierarchy’ in 
some literatures] and distance networking), which allows them to function without being in 
dominant clusters. Their specific locational patterns across regions (i.e. spatial organization) 
reflects, our study suggests, as much particular entrepreneurial traits, proximities to universities 
and spin-off effects as the factors traditionally are emphasized in the literature.  
Our approach requires a more detailed unpacking of the production processes within the 
firm as well as understanding of its distant network; much more detailed than is normally the 
case in comparable studies (see consequences for methods below). This is needed to understand 
the nature of the project work. Our finding complements the dominant explanation based on 
cluster approaches and thus suggests a way of expanding the scope of research on the spatial 
organization of creative industries to appreciate their heterogeneity and the idiosyncracies of 
                                                 
2 For data reasons we have had to delimit the study to the spatial organization within the US. Tschangs studies 
on outsourcing of videogames to the Philippines documents how the US firms mainly outsource the non-creative 
parts of the production process.  
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each industry. It also demonstrates how grounded insights can be used as heuristic devices for 
generating new and relevant research questions for other creative industries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. We begin in the second 
section by reviewing agglomeration approaches and suggesting the gaps in research. The third 
section which outlines our research methodology, partly influenced by a grounded theory-
building approach based on interview, archival and ethnographic data3. In the fourth section, we 
lay out the empirical part of the paper. This section is opened by an introduction to the context – 
the US videogames industry. Then we present the stylized facts of the spatial organization of the 
industry. This is followed by an analysis of what constitutes these patterns. The paper is rounded 
off with a concluding section that discusses the research findings and implications for studies of 
the spatial organization of the creative industries.     
 
2 Approaches to studying creative clusters: a review 
 
This section introduces the dominant approaches and findings on the spatial organization of 
creative industries. The section does not aim to provide a full account of the debate, and focuses 
solely on the clustering aspects and literature; thus it does not include other approaches that 
relate to the spatial organizational of the production chain (see Pratt 2002b, 2004a, Power and 
Hallencreutz 2005).  We argue that the dominant explanation de facto refers to cluster(ing) studies 
and therefore is insufficient for explaining the spatial organization of creative industries per se.  
 
2.1 A metropolitan view of industries 
 
                                                 
3 Hence, contrary to deductive research we do not ‘close’ the theoretical section with devising a theoretical 
alternative as this runs against the central notions of grounded research.  
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The sheer diversity of literature explaining the clustering of creative industries appears to make it 
challenging to provide a comprehensive review of it. Having said that, one can argue that this 
literature can be said to rest on variants of traditional Marshallian agglomeration factors and the 
so-called Jacob’s factors (i.e. urbanization factors). The importance of the Jacobs factors is found 
in the observation that creative industries tend to locate in large – or rather the largest - 
metropolitan areas. Scott (2001) emphasizes this urban turn when he explains that he attempts to 
provide ‘ … a theoretical outline of how and why cities like these [Paris, New York, L.A, Tokyo, 
Paris and Milan] come to operate as major poles of the cultural economy’ (p.13).  Hence, the 
analytical focus is mainly on why creative industries such as film and advertising tend to cluster 
in large metropolitan areas, and not so much on why some others do not. Grabher for example 
only analyses the Soho-based firms; not the advertising firms outside Soho. Scott (2002, 2004) 
looks mainly on Hollywood’s and Paris’s film production, with some attention to the runaway 
film productions (i.e., ones who have moved) to Canada (Pratt (2005) does pay attention to rural 
areas in filmmaking, Johns and Coe looks at ‘provincial’ film making in England). In fashion 
Scott focuses on Los Angeles’ industry while Rantisi (2002) examines New York’s. In the multi-
media industries Pratt (2002a) pays attention to ‘Silicon Gulch’ in San Francisco.  
In line with the Marshallian oriented studies of industrial districts and clusters, these 
studies link the locational choices to the knowledge externalities (i.e. collective learning, 
interactive learning) in a broad sense; this being specialized or diversified labor markets, 
institutional specialization and recently a more efficient buzz (Amin 1999; Beccatini 1990; Brusco 
1990).  Scott reaches almost the same conclusions by way of a transaction costs approach (1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2004) where he pays more attention to the costs of transactions as opposed to 
understanding learning trajectories. Scott sees clustering as a function of the vertical 
disintegration of larger firms and an associated growth in external transactions, thus clustering is 
a way of economizing on this growing number of external transactions. These studies tend to 
differ from more traditional cluster or industrial districts studies on one significant dimension: by 
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stressing the heterogeneous features of cities (Scott 2001, Asheim and Vang 2004, 2005, Asheim, 
Hansen and Vang 2005).  (This is in opposition to the locating of activity in non-urban industrial 
districts (i.e. clusters outside the largest cities such as Prato in Toscany) or clusters based on a 
high degree of homogeneity in terms of shared values, visions, etc.) 
 
2.2 Face-to-face and buzz 
 
It is reasoned that we often find creative industries located in the biggest of cities because of the 
latter’s high frequency of buzz and high degree of competency-heterogeneity (or diversified labor 
markets, as opposed to specialized labor markets, as stressed in the Marshallian literature). Buzz 
refers to the unplanned and haphazard aspect of face-to-face contacts (see Storper and Venables 
2004, and also Maskell et al 2004, Bathelt et al 2004, Malmberg 2003). Buzz is supposed to be a 
superadditive form of information circulation, generating increasing returns for people who are 
in the buzz, and for the agglomerations in which they work (Storper and Venables 2004). Buzz is 
also supposed to be important as it allows for the fast circulation of information (i.e. who is 
available, who is starting to collaborate etc. - which is sometimes referred to as the ‘matching 
problem’) and to some extent also knowledge (i.e. outcomes of experiments with collaboration 
techniques). Grabher (2001) has provided some of the richest descriptions of buzz in his studies 
of the advertising industry. Barthelt (2005) argues that the lack of buzz is behind the Leipzig’s 
media cluster’s lack of success. Pratt (2002a) illustrates the importance of buzz to the multimedia 
industries. Scott (2004) alludes to in his most recent book on Hollywood’s film industry and 
Asheim et al (2006) notes of its importance to the Danish film industry. Florida (2002) - the least 
Marshallian of the authors – can be read as identifying the conditions that allows for such a 
‘buzzing’ area to develop; this is admittedly a creative reading as he is more concerned with the 
consumptive practices of creative people. Based on his indexes for openness (the cool index, the 
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bohemian index and the gay index), Florida found a significant positive correlation between 
these variables and the cities ability to attract talents (those that can buzz together). 4 
 
“It is talent that orients the location decisions of firms and which underpins the 
formation and evolution of industrial clusters. … places certainly matter in the 
economic geography of talent and in the attraction of high human capital 
individuals on which growth depends. Places provide the infrastructure required 
to generate, attract, and retain talent. The findings suggest that these place-based 
advantages stem in turn from two underlying economic factors: low entry 
barriers to human capital and efficiencies in the delivery of consumer services. 
Taken together, I suggest, these two characteristics increase the attractiveness of 
places to high human capital, talented individuals. In other words, it is not simply 
observed characteristics such as diversity or amenities that matter in the 
economic geography of talent. These observed characteristics reflect real 
economic advantages in the location of talent. Simply put, there is an economic 
rationale behind what may be perceived as “nice” places to live” (Florida 2002: 
32-33). 
 
2.3 Project organization as dominant organizational form in creative industries 
 
Graber (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004, see also Ekinsmyth 2002 for a different perspective) 
links the need for buzz – “noise” in his vocabulary - to the ‘nature’ of these industries and to the 
one-off project (see Lorensen and Frederiksen 2004 for documentation of this claim). The one-
off projects are relying on clustering in urban areas. The creative industries – as with several 
other industries – tend to rely increasingly on the project form of work organization, since the 
                                                 
4 Florida views creative industries in a broader sense than we do. 
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projects tend to facilitate a combination of innovation and fast adaptation to current trends or 
fashions. The projects are often one-off activities and, hence, they do not need to carry the 
burden of previous staff, conflicts and conventions; they allow the sourcing of the competencies 
needed for the particular project and allow for selection from a vast possible combination of 
competencies (Grabher is not always clear on whether projects are mainly inter-or intra-firm but 
the sourcing argument suggests the inter-firm dimension). This provides a fluid organizational 
form adapted to innovations and flexibility. Thus the story goes. In other words, the Marshallian 
focus on long lasting relations is replaced by a focus on ephemeral types of collaboration. 
Furthermore, as the projects are one-off, the creative workers tend to prefer to work and live in 
locations where they can jump to the next project when one project is terminated. This jumping 
is made possible by a) a large geographically concentrated demand for their skills and b) their 
geographically concentrated network of weak and strong ties (Graber 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). 
However, while the project constitutes a solution to coping with the demand for being 
innovative and flexible, it causes problems with respect to cumulative learning (Acha et al 2005, 
Vang and Zellner 2005). Projects are dissolved, and experience gained is forgotten, or at least not 
stored in the firms involved in the project; unless they locate in urban clusters. These urban 
clusters constitute arenas – or ecology in Graber’s words - which are tied together by dense 
networks that provide a more “permanent” dimension to the ephemeral dimensions of projects. 
In other words, it facilitates cumulative learning despite the fact that such learning is not 
automatically built into one-off projects. Storper and Christopherson’s seminal papers and 
Scott’s follow up on the film industry illustrate these mechanisms clearly. Grabher’s studies on 
the advertising industry follow in similar fashion. Despite it being widely ignored in 
contemporary cluster studies, Beccattini’s (1990, 1997) seminal papers on fashion in Prato also 
highlights the importance of projects (albeit in a different vocabulary).   
 The ephemeral nature of creative industries is however exaggerated in this approach as 
the attention is almost only on the projects; not paying sufficient attention to  the importance of 
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in-house organization and the trade-offs between relying on knowledge externalities and internal 
mechanisms as capability and competences. In other words it reproduces the Marshallian focus 
on the external dimensions (i.e. collective and interactive learning etc.) and tends to ignore the 
importance of in-house mechanisms for understanding the spatial organization of creative 
industries. 
 
2.4 Summing up and suggesting research gaps 
 
The need for firms in creative industries to source for diverse sets of different competencies on a 
regular basis (in a way that allows for cumulative learning) and the creative industries’ demand 
for ‘project-workers’ leads to the clustering of the creative industries in large cities (Kong 2005, 
Gibson and Kong 2005). Clustering in large urban areas, Florida claims, occurs as these areas 
provide an environment of openness and tolerance favored by the creative workers. This story 
contributes to Marshall’s seminal work while also staying true to Jacob’s stressing of the 
knowledge externalities that contribute to collaborations. Further, this is opposed to the long 
lasting types of collaborations typically found in industrial districts and clusters. 5  This 
interpretation is supported by Whitley (2005) who uses the literature to develop a particular 
theory on project-based industries and Gibson and Kong’s (2005) survey of the field. While this 
explanation is reasonable to segments of the creative industries, there is now an emerging 
literature coming up with alternative explanations, and which ultimately suggests a heterogeity 
within creative industries that is dependent on their nature of production. In a study on the 
organization of the comic book industry’s production, Norcliffe and Rendace (2003) conclude: 
 
“As this study of the comic book industry has shown, other less agglomerated 
spatial configurations of cultural production are also discernable. The study 
                                                 
5 This explanation can be read from the cases despite their lack of clarity on their explanatory power and intentions. 
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discussed the case of an industry that was formerly concentrated in metropolitan 
centers but more recently has decentralized substantially while leaving an 
important element – the head of office and editorial function – in major cities” 
(p. 260). 
 
Other challenges can be found in Izushi and Aoyama’s comparative work on the video 
game industry’s evolution in Japan, US and UK (Izushi and Aoyama, 2006). Power and 
Hallencreutz’s (2002) studies on the music industry and Pratt’s (2004a, 2004b) production chain 
model or production of culture-model. In other words there is an emerging literature with 
alternative empirical findings. What most of these authors share is the emerging realization that 
the existing research provides a more narrow insight. Hence, a significant research gap is 
concerned with what determines or conditions the spatial organization of the creative industries. 
The reminder of the paper sets out to conduct a grounded analysis of the spatial organization of 
the US videogames industry. 
 
3. Methods 
The approach taken in this study was to begin to construct a multi-level view of a creative 
industry. This began with interviews of industry participants, specifically, developers, in 2003 and 
following through to 2005. These initial interviews were initially conducted with designers and 
studio heads from 17 videogame companies (these were augmented in later stages during the 
ethnographic data collection stage through interviews with other designers and developers met in 
the studios and in developer conferences). In between, secondary information on the industry’s 
production processes was acquired from secondary and other sources, including the industry’s 
periodical, Game Developer. This latter included more than 65 project postmortems highlighting 
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various factors that inhibited or aided individual projects’ development6. Finally, detailed case 
ethnographic studies were conducted on four studios (one being in the startup phase during our 
last visit), consisting of multiple visits of a week or more to each studio over the course of three 
years.  
Following from conventional qualitative research methods, we iterated on theories and 
even specific research questions, and focused later stages of data gathering on refining the 
observations or confirming them. The overall research question was initially focused on 
understanding the broad outlines of how this creative industry worked, and how individual 
creativity functioned within an industrial context. Eventually, the study turned to the study of 
group collaborative work, and where a richer understanding of the game development process – 
especially its creative and rational aspects - was developed. At the same time, through interviews 
and interactions with industry participants, we found out where they came from (i.e., starting 
location and industry) and why they came to particular locations and studios, and conditions 
under which their studios formed. This helped to support our emerging view of industry location. 
Our current view of “clusters” was thus formed by our discussion of how individual firms 
operate. 
 
4 The spatial organization of the US videogames industry 
 
This section constitutes the  empirical part of the paper. We start with a brief historical overview 
of the industry and introduction to the structure of the industry – which form the context for the 
study. This is followed by the presentation on the stylized facts about the location of the US 
videogame studios in the US. Subsequently, we turn to unpacking the production process and 
analyzing how the specificities of the production process. This requires governance modes 
                                                 
6 Published in Game Developer. While this paper is based on the first 65 postmortems, more were added to the 
sample at a later stage. 
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associated with in-house capabilities and distant networking than normally assumed in the 
literature, and as a consequence, less on traded and untraded externalities7.    
  
4.1. A Brief Un-illustrated History of Videogames: Introducing the context  
 
The US videogames industry has only been around in its commercial form for just over three 
decades, with the first “computer games” dating back to early pioneers such as physicist Willy 
Higginbotham’s computer game – a kind of forerunner to Atari’s Pong videogame - at the 
Brookhaven National Laboratories as an equipment demonstration exercise, and to a group of 
MIT students who developed Spacewar as a “fun demonstration” for a new mini-computer at 
MIT in 1961. Since then, a variety of different dedicated television gaming consoles have 
supported the growth of the videogames industry by requiring their own accompanying format-
specific suites of videogame titles. 
With the growth of household personal computers in the 1980s and 1990s, computer 
games have flourished and provided some stability to the market for videogames, primarily by 
way of providing an installed base of machines that could play those games, and that were 
constantly being upgraded (e.g. through new microprocessors, and more recently, graphic cards). 
The 1980s through the early 1990s were characterized as an era of innovation; however, the 
1990s were when several genres matured (DeMaria and Wilson 2002), although some observers 
also noted that less innovation occurred. As newer consoles have greatly lowered hardware 
prices and increased performance, the computer games share of the market have come down 
considerably.8 The advances in videogame technology can be seen in terms of what technology 
makes possible on the screen. At the “dawn” of videogames, with titles like Pac Man, the 
“character” was basically a blob with no “personality” or face, moving around on the screen. 
                                                 
7 Obviously, externalities related to the available skill sets are central in all explanations. 
8 However, given that the PC’s input device – the keyboard – allows more forms of text and symbolic input, PCs 
provide users with a greater range of user interactivity. 
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With the first 8-bit color graphics technology, well-known characters like Nintendo’s Mario 
appeared with the beginnings of identity, but no personality and limited movement set and 
animations. With the first 3-dimensional graphics cards, Naughty Dog’s Crash Bandicoot mascot 
for Sony’s Playstation had 500 polygons that had some personality, complex movement 
repertoires and good animation. Currently, the 3-D technology is so advanced that characters 
have over 3000 polygons, a “full” personality (i.e., more expressiveness and a wider range of 
emotional reactions), limitless movement and excellent animation.9  
 
4.2 Structure of the Industry: extending the context 
 
The videogames industry at present consists of two types of actors: the studio, which develops 
the videogames, and the publisher, which funds the studios’ development of the videogames, 
and acts as a bridge to the broader market of retailers and consumers by marketing and 
distributing the videogames. (It is important to recognize that when we refer to firms, we are 
usually referring to the stand alone studio responsible for the creative work, and not the 
intermediary such as the publisher). In financial terms, the publisher acts plays a role similar to 
that of venture capitalists in the technology industries by funding the early through final stages of 
a videogame’s development, and by funding multiple titles, including both mainstays, and 
occasionally, more innovative projects with higher risks but potentially higher returns (Tschang 
2007). Publishers also evaluate videogames in progress, and may stop funding the product 
altogether if something goes awry, or if the publisher’s strategy changes course. In this regard, 
the publisher is critical to the survival of individual development studios. Publishers may come 
from different types of backgrounds. Some like Take Two Interactive, Sierra Entertainment and 
Electronic Arts (EA) are pure videogame publishers, while others are allied with computer and 
                                                 
9 Jason Rubin, “Great Game Graphics…Who Cares?”, Game Developer Conference, San Jose, 2003. 
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media conglomerates, e.g. Sony and Microsoft, and others are part of multi-industry 
conglomerates, e.g. Vivendi’s former holdings.  
By one count, in 2004, there were at least 430 studios, including internal studios owned 
by publishers. 10  11  In addition to this, there were 1073 independent contractors who do 
outsourced work for other game studios or publishers on audio, design, production, 
programming, testing/quality assurance, video production and visual arts. There were about 116 
publishers in the US, but the world’s largest 20 publishers (including nine from Japan, three from 
Europe and eight from the US) accounted for $15.5 billion in total revenue worldwide, which 
was highly significant as it is larger than the total videogames market in the US of about $6.9 
billion,12 and represents a dominant share of the worldwide revenue, estimated at $20.7 billion.13 
These top 20 publishers published 687 titles worldwide, at an average cost of a couple to a few 
million dollars per title. Out of the US market of $6.9 billion in 2002, console videogames 
constituted $5.5 billion whereas computer games constituted $1.4 billion (IDSA 2003).  
It is helpful to think of videogames as having three main interwoven aspects: design, 
technology and art, developed by designers, programmers and artists respectively. Artistic 
content consists of the objects and backgrounds developed by artists; dialogue, text and speech 
written by writers; and the sound effects and musical scores made by sound developers or 
musicians. Videogame design essentially involves creating game play, or the set of logical rules 
and other manners by which the player interacts with the videogame. The technology consists of 
the programming or code written by programmers. This code essentially allows the objects in the 
videogame (represented by the artistic content) to move around and to interact with each other 
in the game as well as with players (in ways determined by the game play and the logical rules set 
up by designers). Due to the highly interactive nature of these components, each of these three 
                                                 
10 This is the number that has registered on the industry association’s website. While there could be more studios 
than this, and while many studios may be entering and leaving the industry, we will use this number as a 
roughly representative number for the purposes of showing the spread of studios and clusters across the U.S. 
11 The top 20 publishers worldwide owned 65 such “internal studios”. 
12 2002 U.S. Entertainment Software Sales, Entertainment Software Association. 
13 2002 DFC Intelligence News Report 
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types of creative workers needs to work closely with the others. For instance, the programmers’ 
development of code is primarily determined by the designers’ design for how the videogame 
should play. Similarly, art and programming are interrelated, e.g. artists often work in 
consultation with designers and programmers, who help determine what can feasibly (within 
technological constraints) be represented onscreen; and design is related to artistic work. 
 
4.3 The spatial organization of the US videogames industry 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the US videogame industry is fairly well dispersed across the US in a number 
of large concentrations (or clusters), as well as in many smaller concentrations and solitary 
studios. Concentrations of more than eight studios are few in number, namely, New York with 
16 studios, Austin with 14 studios, LA with 19 studios (including seven in Santa Monica), and 
Seattle with 10 studios.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
There are also some other secondary concentrations that do not show in the map, such as the 
smaller concentrations in the vicinity of the San Francisco Bay Area, including seven studios in 
San Raphael just north of the Golden Gate Bridge, five in Redwood City and four in San Jose. 
Another potentially interesting phenomenon is that smaller concentrations can be found all 
across the country. Concentrations of four or more studios can be found all over the country in 
cities like Redmond, Kirtland and Bellevue (all in Washington state), to Las Vegas, Atlanta, 
Chicago, San Diego, Portland (Oregon), Eugene (Oregon), and Houston.  In this respect, the 
studios’ locating behavior shows that at least some creative industries like videogames are not 
wholly concentrated in one or two cities. Thus it resists being conceptualized in the cluster 
vocabulary; it is too dispersed across regions. This is not a unique pattern – or an outliner in 
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creative industries - as it is similar to the simultaneously concentrated and dispersed pattern 
observed in Cornford and Naylor (2001) on their study of videogames in the UK, Norcliff and 
Rendall in their study of comics books production and Vang (2007) in his study of the news 
media industries. 
In addition, as the four regional maps show, even firms within a particular city area can 
actually be quite dispersed. Given the secrecy and lack of communication between studios, this is 
quite understandable. The San Francisco (SF) and Los Angeles areas are two of the larger 
concentrations, but videogame studios are highly dispersed within them. In the San Francisco 
area, there are a few studios south of SF in the San Jose area, a few in the Redwood City area, 
and a number north of SF in Marin County. Since most of these operate independently of each 
other (judging from our site visits to four firms), there are none of the traditional spillover-types 
of agglomerative factors at work.  
In many cases, their close proximity is more likely an issue of spin-offs situating 
themselves not too far from the mother company. Within the Marin county area, one interviewee 
estimated that about half the firms, including his own, were started by ex-Lucas Arts employees. 
Lucas Arts, an at one time huge multifaceted videogame development studio in the Marin 
County area, has 300 or more developers and is co-located with the Lucas Film movie studio.  
Indeed, Lucas Film was itself located in Marin County because George Lucas decided that he 
preferred the location for its environment. This spin-off explanation is also consistent with the 
existence of concentrations in cities like Dallas and Austin. Firms that located in those areas, like 
Ensemble Studios in Dallas and Ion Storm-Austin (both also formed of developers who left 
Boston’s Looking Glass) also benefit from migrating talent as well as the local talent. The Austin 
cluster started partly because of the density of students and student related activities.  Like 
Looking Glass, id Software, developer of the famed video game Doom, was another example of a 
firm that spun off many other companies. id had its origins in a group in Baton Rouge which 
moved, first to Madison, then to Dallas (Kushner 2003). 
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The stylized facts we observed on the spatial organization thus challenge the dominant 
cluster explanations in the following ways: 
 
• There is not much correlation between the size of a cluster and “industrial performance” 
as measured by the renown of its firms (e.g. despite New York’s size, there are no 
significant studios in the cluster), hence this does not support the literature’s view of 
simple correlation between urban clustering and performance in creative industries.  
• There are good examples of well-performing stand alone studios. That is, firms not 
embedded in clusters at all. The firms function by reliance on in-house capabilities and 
distant networks (as we will return to below). 
• Clustered firms are not relying on traded and untraded interdependencies or other 
regularly emphasized externalities – apart from the available skills sets – or other types of 
interaction. Firms in the clusters simply do not work much together or have interactions. 
As such, any observed clustering is often a function of spin offs.  
 
We will now turn to explaining: in section 4.4, how the spatial organization of the industry can 
persist, in section 4.5, what the industry case has to say about other conventional factors, and in 
section 4.6, how the industry arrived at a spatial organization distributed across the US (i.e. 
differing from the dominant theories). In presenting the case this way, we also highlight the value 
and need to look at clusters from a more comprehensive view: that is, an evolutionary one that 
understands the factors that create a cluster as being potentially different from the factors that 
sustain a cluster. 
 
4.4 Persistence in the spatial organization of the US videogames industry 
 
4.4.1 Why in-house capabilities and not externalities: The Product Development Process  
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In order to assess why externalities are less important than argued by the cluster-literature the 
reasons for reliance on ‘hierarchy’ or in-house capabilities needs to be identified; this is done by 
unpacking the product development process. (We note that the use of the term hierarchy here 
connotates internal organization more than it does a significant number of levels of management 
or a top-down nature to project coordination, although as we will later show, in actual practice, 
the need to exercise creative control does require a significant amount of control over creativity). 
Videogame product development can be seen in terms of both individual work and 
team-based processes (with the latter being more production-oriented). Both creative and 
technical forms of work factor into these activities. The typical videogame development process 
consists of multiple stages (Aoyama and Izushi 2003, Baba and Tschang 2001). First, at the 
conceptualization stage, some inspiration or market need causes the creation of the first high 
level concept of vision for the videogame. This is usually done by one or a few individual 
designers or other concept developers who map the game’s basic concept and game play in a 
page or so of text (this will later be expanded to a detailed proposal that can be dozens of pages 
long). Next, at the preproduction stage, some of these initial designers or visionaries will sit 
down with a core team (consisting of artists and programmers) to flesh out the design and to 
prototype sections in progressively greater detail. Usually, these “demo” sections are used to 
attract a publisher to fund the production stage. At the production stage, a larger team is brought 
on board for one to two more years to fully complete the videogame, including the development 
of the multiple “levels” of play that a player experiences going through the game. Extensive 
testing takes place near the end of production, and is followed by the videogames’ release and 
“patching” (i.e., corrections or improvements to the code, which are made available to the 
game’s purchasers). The lead conceptual designer may also lead the team from conceptualization 
through to the project’s completion, or alternatively, another designer or creative director will act 
as a “keeper of the vision” by managing the implementation of the design.   
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These processes are organized as projects, but with fairly different characteristics than 
identified in studies of other creative industries (hence, a different reliance on externalities). First, 
videogame projects have a longer project time.  For example, in advertising, while the accounts 
themselves can last for longer terms of two to three years (Grabher 2002b), the discrete 
advertising projects within each account tend to be much shorter. In contrast, videogames 
require a longer sustained period (for 1.5 to 4 years) of constant interaction amongst team 
members on a single project. This time difference alone signifies a potentially different mode of 
work from “short-term” projects in which the “co-location of project partners” becomes 
important (Grabher 2002b). The various forces, involving intense onsite collaboration in the 
development of interactive products and the need for hierarchical control over creativity, can 
cause videogame development to become a “closed system” of production – unlike that seen in 
technology firms and movie production. All this tends to favor long-term onsite development 
rather than a network of dispersed developers that are temporarily called in to work14. A second 
aspect of the production process is the need for secrecy. New projects are hardly ever discussed 
outside of the studio, unless it is with publishers, or unless the publishers deem it necessary to 
provide the market with some news of upcoming titles. Literally everyone working in the 
industry is bound by a non-disclosure agreement – in part because of publishers’ concerns – 
which forbids developers from discussing anything to do with the specific product or 
development processes. The mode of work (and secrecy involved) as seen in our four 
ethnographic case studies suggests that there is little or no need for interaction amongst different 
studios.  
One consequence of the longer term of project and the need for secrecy is that “hanging 
out” or “idea sharing” (as seen in the studies that find a “buzz” in the region) is not promoted. 
Thus, while the (external) network’s “interactivity” can be a potential source of innovation in 
                                                 
14 There is however a phenomena of people temporarily called in at certain points in the project to help ‘start’ or 
‘finish’ it, e.g. the testers that are added at late stages to fully test the product. 
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sectors such as the new media (Heydebrand and Miron 2002), in videogames, it is the internal 
production processes (i.e., group work of co-located individuals) that are the basis for innovation. 
Thus, while videogames share some aspects in common with other types of project-based 
organizations (e.g. Ekinsmyth 2002, Grabher 2000a), there are also significant differences. 
One longer-term strategy for studios is to grow into a fully fledged studio capable of 
taking on multiple projects simultaneously. Because of this, studios would much rather keep their 
experienced employees than disband them and accrue additional search costs in finding new 
employees for the next project (as happens with the advertising or movie industry). A second but 
less common strategy is for the studio to become a publisher in its own right with ownership and 
control over its own IP. Blizzard and Rock Star Games are examples of studios that became 
successful publishers in their own right. Both studios became successful because of their own 
titles (i.e. IP), were then able to begin acting as publishers, and finally, contracted with other 
studios to produce new titles (sometimes based on the original “story universe” that they had 
created). This can however be at odds with the publishers’ own desire to control and extract the 
rents from IP (Tschang, 2007). Studios can improve their bargaining position by seeking out 
multiple publishers in order to secure the best deal, or sometimes, if they do not have the 
reputation, by subsuming themselves to the publisher, and producing only what publishers want 
(i.e., effectively to provide outsourcing services). 
In summary, the specificities associated with the product development processes favors 
an in-house capabilities or hierarchy-based governance mode and thus provide a significant brick 
in explaining why firms in the videogames industry do not rely on externalities to the extent 
suggested in the literature on clustering of creative industries. This opens the degrees of freedom 
in locational choices and thus helps explaining why the firms dispersed across regions and not 
concentrated in one or two regions. This insight supports the call for more attention to the 
theoretical aspects of the firm in economic geography as has been suggested several times (see 
for example Taylor and Asheim 2001).  
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In addition, the degrees of freedom is enlarged by the fact that that videogames are a 
virtual product based on ideas constructed from different influences in the popular culture, and 
given that source material or references can be found in books and on the Internet, most of the 
creative development can be done independently of the studio’s location (own interviews).    
 
4.4.2 The importance of lead talent and control over creativity favor hierarchy (i.e., in-
house capabilities) 
 
Oftentimes, studios are set up by creator-entrepreneurs with the panache to handle both the 
creative work (often in the design role) as well as the business side – at least while the studio is 
small. Another issue is that project work is defined by both coordinated group work as well as 
the creative work of individuals. The need to have a singular creative vision, and to encourage 
creativity across the whole group, can cause tensions, and therefore, create a need to control this 
creativity (Tschang, 2007). Said another way, this also creates a reliance on governance modes 
associated with in-house capabilities. The literature’s treatment of this tension is still somewhat 
simplistic, as it suggests that either projects have to be actively managed (Heyderbrand and 
Miron 2002), or conceived as self-organized (Jeffcutt and Pratt 2002), but it does not directly 
address the tensions inherent in the combination of the two principles and the derived 
implications for the spatial organization of an industry (i.e. the reliance on externalities). In the 
videogames industry, our observations show that creativity clearly occurs at both the top and 
bottom of the project team. Creativity is the motive force behind the industry’s growth, and the 
lead creators are respected and highly prized in the industry. Through our interviews with 
designers, it was clear that in many projects, particularly innovative ones, there tends to be a 
dominant designer or creator (i.e., the lead ‘creative’) who has the ultimate creative influence 
over all the content, design and code developed. This tendency acts in opposition to the need to 
empower creativity “at the bottom”, especially since all developers, from programmers to artists 
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and designers, are considered essential creative contributors. The daily work of each employee 
involves coming up with creative ideas that help to define a product, or the creative 
implementation of those ideas. This tension between creativity at the top and bottom levels is 
often resolved by the top exercising some sort of hierarchical control. The creator or his 
designated lead designer is usually seen to be “controlling” the project by ensuring that the initial 
design or vision was fully carried out, that changes made in later stages of the project are 
consistent with that vision, and that all members of the team are on board with this vision at all 
steps of the process. As with Grabher’s (2002a) notion of “contractors” (i.e., account managers 
and other “integrators”), these lead designers ensure that the initial concept of the game is fully 
implemented, and that the resources are brought into production. 
 In sum, the need for solving the tension between creativity and control (in the context of 
long lasting projects) tend to favor an in-house arrangement of work and thus less reliance on 
location in clusters. 
  
4.4.3 The distant network dimension: the link to the publisher 
 
The publisher is a critical actor in the whole system, given its control over critical resources. As 
shown later, the data bears out how much publishers rely on external studios, and seeks to deal 
with the most capable, if not the best, of them. The reliance on the in-house organization of 
product development is complemented by a reliance on a distanced network tie with a 
publisher.15 The central external relationship in the videogames industry which all independent 
studios are preoccupied with is the relationship with their publisher. A studio’s financial stability, 
and therefore, its success or failure, depends on whether it accomplishes what the publishers 
want, including the meeting of deadlines. One source of tension between publishers and studios 
                                                 
15 We will not dwell on issues of density, structure, importance of position in the network and configuration but on 
the distanciation dimension only due to the focus of the paper. 
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is that both sides want to own, control and extract the rents from IP for their own purposes of 
growth. This was observed in Tschang (2007), as well as by Cornford and Naylor (2001) who 
note of the “geographical expression of the continually contested relationship between 
developers and publishers that lies at the heart of the industry”. This creates an unusual decision 
for publishers. On the one hand, the publisher has a strong need for control, since one of the 
biggest factors that affects a particular title’s success is the uncertainty in the videogame 
production process (and especially in individual studios’ processes), and the receptivity of users 
to all aspects of a videogame. Uncertainty and risk appears to be a common aspect of modern 
creative industries (Girard and Stark 2002). Thus, in a hits-driven industry, the need to be 
successful can create enormous pressures on publishers to control IP and its production. This 
suggests that publishers have good reasons for locating close to their game developers (or to pick 
game developing firms located in close proximity)16 yet this is rarely the case. This brings up the 
issue of whether and how publishers deal with significant numbers of studios at a distance. In 
our estimation, most of the studios that we studied, and certainly all four that we studied 
ethnographically, were located at a long distance from their publishers. Table 1 shows that while 
the major publishers happen to be located in or near concentrations of external studios, many 
publishers are also scattered across the country. The 8 largest publishers, which earn a total of 
about US $6.5 billion in revenue, are scattered across different cities for the most part.  Thus, 
these largest publishers appear to be scouring for the best internal studios to work with or to 
acquire, regardless of where the studios are located. This observation is supported by evidence of 
the geographical separation between publishers and their internal studios. Many of the internal 
studios owned or acquired by the major publishers are not co-located with the publisher’s main 
offices, and many are not even in the major concentrations. Of the top eight US publishers, only 
17 of their 44 internal studios are in the same state as the headquarters. (In fact, the results are 
                                                 
16 Insourcing game production is another leg in the publishers strategy which we will not comment on here as it 
is relevant for strategies but not assessing the importance of distanciated networks.  
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skewed by EA and Activision which have 5 of 8 and 6 of 7 in state.) Three other major 
publishers (Microsoft, Vivendi and Take Two) have none in the same state.  Some large 
publishers have tended to acquire studios (for their internal operations) that were operating in 
locations all over the world. For example, Take-Two Interactive, has studios and cities in the US, 
including Boston, St. Louis, the outskirts of Baltimore, and all the subsidiary studios of Rock Star 
Games (publisher of the Grand Theft Auto series), including ones in Leeds, London Edinburgh, 
Vienna, Toronto and San Diego. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
This pattern is visible in part because publishers simply have to work with the best (lead_ 
creative) talent wherever they are at. In the case of Electronics Arts, they have to support their 
well-known lead creator Will Wright and his studio at the location of his preference. 
The “how” of this pattern of distance work is the familiar story of studios coordinating 
their work with publishers through electronic means and face-to-face meetings. The virtual 
nature of the product also allows studios to email or mail their prototypes to publishers in 
different locations. Other activities such as discussions on testing and production meetings are 
done through conference calls and electronic communications as well. All three of the studios 
that we studied in-depth facilitated their relationships with publishers with these means. During 
our field study to one studio, developers were regularly seen to be in discussion with their 
publisher’s visiting producers or in conference calls over the phone nearly every couple of days 
for a period of the weeks that we were in residence. For example, one studio we interviewed at, 
Oddworld, was initially located in San Luis Obispo, California, about two to three hours drive 
from Los Angeles, but their publishers also flew in from out-of-state to keep check on their 
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progress.17 Thus, while publishers do tend to be located in or near concentrations of videogame 
studios, the presence of strong studios outside of those concentrations can be explained by these 
means of maintaining production relations at distances. In this sense, the spatial organization of 
the videogames industry is closer to the music or comics industry than to the Silicon 
Valley/Hollywood models, in that videogames publishers have to contend with the dispersed 
nature of the development studios. In the music industry, global financier-distributors also 
develop relationships with dispersed groups of musicians by way of locally situated offices, as 
well as by managing from a distance (Power and Hallencreutz 2002).  
 
4.5 Do the traditional clustering processes play an important role? 
 
We next examine two central aspects of traditional cluster explanations – the local suppliers and 
the labor market (i.e. availability of skill sets). This helps us to determine how these other 
clustering factors affect spatial organization.   
 
4.5.1 The importance of the local suppliers 
 
A traditionally important factor underpinning clustering is that of technology suppliers. The new 
media clusters are also said to benefit from localized suppliers because the clusters are network-
based (Grabher, 2002a). While the videogame industry does not tend to have strong supplier 
networks, our interviews as well as the postmortem data suggest that the use of commercial tools 
and proven “middleware” or engine technology is becoming more commonplace. While tools are 
sourced from the few software companies that make them, wherever they may be, engine 
                                                 
17 Its founder, a former Hollywood art director, found the city, a scenic rural coastal location, personally to his liking. 
Oddworld has since relocated to the Oakland, San Francisco Bay Area, with its desire to go upstream in the 
conceptualization of intellectual property, and to move away from game production. Through such interviews, we 
also confirmed that publishers such as Microsoft, EA and Blizzard will regularly fly their producers around the 
country for face-to-face meetings with studios, in order to evaluate their progress. 
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suppliers are another matter. The sourcing is not well-confined to the spatial boundaries of the 
cluster. Given the wide variety of game play and fairly customized way in which a particular 
engine fits a particular type of game play, many studio licensees will have to use the best fitting 
engine regardless of where its developer (studio) is located.  
Of the seven companies in our data (i.e. interviews and postmortem data) that discussed 
licensing engines, four used engines developed by other studios located in the same city. A few 
well known engines such as the Dallas-based studio id’s Quake engine are used by many other 
studios, both in the Dallas area as well as from other states. On the surface these cases resembles 
the traditional cluster explanation as the local sourcing appeared to succeed because a certain 
degree of familiarity and trust were present, i.e., the owners in the engine licensee studios had 
either spun off themselves from the licensor studio, or had some pre-established friendship or 
acquaintance with the licensor studio’s head. However, in these cases, our interviews suggested 
that the availability of local technology was more of an “after the fact (of location)” event which 
did not influence the locating behavior of the licensee studios. Hence, trust and familiarity was 
not a function of localized interaction. Furthermore, other studios license whatever engine they 
find to be best fitting to their needs, regardless of the licensors’ location. 
 Increased product complexity and the increasing costs of technology development are 
also leading to the development of an industry structure where some firms, such as Mad Doc 
software in Rockport, Massachusetts, and Vicarious Visions in Troy, New York, now act as 
specialized contractors which do programming or even whole titles (which were usually sequels).  
Increasingly, established studios such as Irrational Games will also work on sequels for 
publishers, so the line between a ‘contractor’ and an ‘established studio’ can blur somewhat. It is 
notable that such contractor studios (and technology suppliers in general) are often not co-
located with their clients. 
Finally, one type of issue that is more unique to media, including constructivist media like 
videogames, is that of the intellectual property (IP). While videogames are sharing more and 
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more links with the movie industry, the same issue of whether studios need to co-locate with IP-
generating industries applies. While many IP agreements or licenses are awarded to studios that 
are not co-located with the IP-holder (which may be a traditional media company), there can be 
possible benefits if the videogame has to be developed in lock-step with the production of the 
original media’s product (e.g., a movie). Costs can come down considerably if videogames and 
movies are made simultaneously or in lock-step with the story and content (e.g. if the movie 
director wishes to “direct” parts of the game , or if the videogame developers have to obtain 
content such as images or action sequences during the movie’s production). At least one two 
studio heads actually moved their offices closer to centers of IP creation (e.g. Hollywood in one 
case) in order to develop IP in cooperation with movie studios. 
 
4.5.2 Local Labor Markets 
Studies of clusters also claims that labor supply is a critical factor attracting the firms to the 
cluster (Angel 2000; Christopherson 2002). Studies of project-based media firms have also 
observed that they can benefit when their networks can tap into surrounding labor pools 
(Grabher, 2002b, Ekinsmyth 2002).  Our interviews show that videogame studio heads consider 
both local and national labor markets to be important, but that the bulk of positions are often 
filled from the local labor markets.  Many studio heads or recruiters still use local networks to 
filter for and to ensure the quality of potential employees, often from other videogame 
companies and other local industries. However, while labor markets are a factor, they are not 
necessarily the factor that causes firms to locate where they do. A study of the UK’s Guilford 
and Surrey regions showed that the significant local labor supply was one of the multiple factors 
that benefited firms in the cluster (Kaplinsky and Grantham 2003). Studies of the Tokyo 
videogame cluster also suggested that many studios located around the “Yamanote line”- the 
main commuter train loop that circles Tokyo, in part because of the universities in the area (Baba 
and Shibuya 2000).  
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In addition to the traditional labor market explanations in the cluster-literature, the labor 
market can also be a factor for larger firms, such as publishers, in deciding where to locate their 
internal studios. On the dismantling of the Las Vegas-based Westwood studios and EA’s 
rationale for consolidating part of that talent into EA’s larger Los Angeles (in-house) studios, 
EA’s director of corporate communications said "LA is a terrific place to hire talent. There's 
tremendous potential to recruit talents from other game companies, other entertainment 
companies, the defense industry and academics."  However, even as EA located its regional 
offices in areas rich with talent such as San Francisco and Los Angeles, it still needed to advertise 
for additional talent in other parts of California and elsewhere. 
The different scale of production makes the videogame industry’s requirements for 
human capital different from industries such as the movie industry. Since videogame studios 
have far fewer people per project than movie studios (with an estimated 20 to 30 employees per 
studio across both our samples and the postmortem samples), it is possible to set up a studio in 
locations without an existing local videogame industry. Well known studios such as PopTop, 
Oddworld, Vicarious Visions and Raven Software are examples of studios that are not located in 
any concentration. In these cases, other local industries than videogames, and the national 
videogame industry labor market, can be vital to filling local studios’ needs.  
In summary, while a videogame development studio can benefit from a local labor 
market, it can also fill its ranks from non-local sources, or from other industries. Universities in 
particular have a role, as talented developers and entrepreneurs can come straight out of college. 
This then appears to be a qualitatively different situation from that of other project-based 
industries. 
 
4.6 On dispersion, or how multiple clusters came about 
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Thus far we have illustrated why the firms rely less on externalities and hence have greater 
degrees of freedom in choosing the location where to locate their firm. Yet, this cannot fully 
explain the spatial organization of the videogames industry as multiple clusters (i.e. dispersion) – 
particularly with no strong observable relation between the size of the cluster and the capability 
of its firms. We will now address three additional factors that help us to more fully identify this 
dispersed locational pattern. To summarize, the map of US videogame development studios’ 
locations shows that videogame studios are located in many parts of the U.S., in variously-sized 
concentrations ranging from isolated studios, to medium- and large-sized concentrations. Since 
most of the processes emphasized in the cluster-literature (save for labor supply) do not appear 
to influence many studios’ locating decisions, there is a strong possibility that a confluence of 
various “non-clustering” factors could influence the spatial organization of the videogames 
industry (i.e. its distribution across regions). We have identified three factors that need to be 
included in a framework explaining the spatial organization of the videogames industry.  
 
4.6.1 Entrepreneurial Efforts 
 
Entrepreneurial effort can easily explain the phenomenon of lone or smaller numbers of 
companies locating in cities that seemingly have fewer videogame studios (from which a larger 
set could be spun off from), or the labor pool to sustain a concentration. Many cities have just 
one or two studios, and at least a few such studios are sufficiently well-established to make their 
existence interesting. The “lead creative as studio founder” phenomenon is quite strong in our 
data, as studios are often located for reasons often having to do with the city being the founder’s 
hometown or current place or residence, or desire to live somewhere in particular. One survey 
noted that “New studios are starting up everywhere, and so jobs are cropping up all over the 
country… Terrific programmers, sometimes whole teams, get disillusioned with the companies 
where they work and strike out to do it on their own.”   Furthermore, another powerful impetus 
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for studio founders to simply locate where they are currently; it occurs, for example, when 
developers who “want to buy a house or raise a family are looking for jobs at videogame 
companies where the cost of living is lower and the pace is slower”. These perspectives are 
reinforced in our interviews: Poptop Software was run by the founder in Saint Louis, Missouri - 
the city of his origin.18 It is a smaller studio with a number of titles to its credit, but still sustains 
itself without attachments to the major concentrations. Similarly, Tilted Mill is located where its 
original developers came from, on the outskirts of Boston. Most of its developers come from the 
surrounding region, but they tend to stay outside of the city, and do not go to Boston on a 
regular basis. The same holds true for Nihilistic software, a spin-off from Lucas Arts located in 
San Rafael, just north of San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge.  
 
4.6.2 Spin-offs: Locally comfortable but also footloose 
 
This brings us to the question of how clusters arise. As was observed by Klepper in several 
studies of the automobile, laser and other industries, spin offs from successful firms in the 
videogames case account for an important share of the clustering. That is, a cluster can form 
from a single or a few early firms. Paradoxically, this can underpin explanations of a spatially 
dispersed industrial organization. Successful spin offs are usually either a function of learning 
based on earlier employment in successful firms or successful firms’ ability to attract the best 
employees who later spin off a company of their own. In an industry such as the videogames 
industry, the low benefits from clustering allows spin offs a higher degree of freedom to choose 
where to locate – often in the same region but not necessarily near the parent firm. Often they 
will choose to locate closer to the parent firm for pragmatic reasons, e.g. the employees already 
living near there, etc. The closure of a well-known studio in Boston - Looking Glass - led to the 
                                                 
18 Poptop was eventually merged with another studio, Firaxis Games in Hunt Valley, Maryland, and then acquired by 
Take-Two Interactive. Take-Two has recently been a takeover target of EA, but Take-Two’s executives have also 
been the focus of many lawsuits. 
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talent dispersing into several companies in the Boston area as well as to other states. A large 
proportion ended up in two local startups that we interviewed - Irrational Games and Harmonics. 
A similar situation happened with Boston-based Impressions, a Sierra internal studio, when a 
group of ex-developers founded Tilted Mill (also in Boston), and other ex-developers seeded 
other studios around Boston, including Turbine Entertainment (this based on our interviews at 
Tilted Mill).  
At the same time, the same data suggests a more footloose outcome, with key Looking 
Glass developers setting up studios or dispersing to studios as far away as San Franciso, Austin 
and Canberra, Australia. Historical cases of well known studios like id software and other cases 
from our data also support this relocation model, with founders of studios we interviewed 
migrating to Los Angeles, San Luis Obispo (California), and Boston, amongst other places, from 
elsewhere. 
 
4.6.3 Universities as Incubators? 
 
While the core team of new studios is usually comprised of experienced talent from existing 
studios (as was the case with all of the companies we interviewed at and visited for our 
ethnographic research), occasionally, local universities and other educational institutions also play 
a role as “incubating” grounds for talent or entrepreneurs, with companies such as Raven and 
Vicarious Visions being founded by former students from the local high school and university 
respectively.  In strong universities, engineering and scientific students tend to have a strong 
interest in playing and making videogames. The Boston area was not known as a videogame 
studio concentration, but a concentration formed in part because of the large pool of university 
students.  One of the most well known companies – Looking Glass – was formed by several 





We have proposed a framework for understanding creative industry cluster formation and 
persistence that provides the logic for the observation that while there are multiple clusters of 
firms (i.e., studios) in the video game industry, the biggest clusters are not necessarily dominant, 
and firms in clusters of small or moderate size can persist and do well. The above findings 
suggest that one dominant explanation in economic geography’s treatment of creative industry – 
that of agglomeration-induced buzz, may not be sufficient for describing all creative industries. 
Our story has also relied on our observations of the (creative) capabilities of the firm, and other 
industry-specific characteristics (i.e. long project durations, lack of reason to connection to 
neighboring firms, and smaller firm sizes), to help explain how it is that firms and clusters can 
persist. Further, cluster growth can be explained to some degree by conventional factors. 
Ultimately, we can also argue that a more fundamental reason for the observed situation is that 
creativity is in short supply everywhere. In certain industries, lead creatives are wherever they are 
located (or move to), and they do not grow up and thrive in the buzz-like atmosphere of super 
concentrations of creative industry. In other words, traditional agglomerative factors simply do 
not operate in a winner-takes-all fashion to benefit the firms located in the larger clusters. 
 This finding has potentially important policy implications for cities that are trying to 
grow “clusters” of creative industry, as well as a theoretical implication for to guide future studies 
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Table 1. Cities with the Largest Number of Game Development Studios and  Major 
Publishers 
 
City, State No.  of  Studios Top 20 publishers (Worldwide) with 
headquarters or regional 
headquarters in the city 
New York, NY 16 Vivendi Universal, Take-Two  
Austin, TX 14   
Los Angeles, CA 12   
Seattle, WA 10   
San Francisco, CA 9   
San Rafael, CA 7   
Santa Monica, CA 7  Activision 
Chicago, IL 6  Midway Games 
Eugene, OR 6   
Redmond, WA 6  Microsoft Game Studios 
Redwood City, CA 5  Electronic Arts 
San Diego, CA 5   
Atlanta, GA 5   
Bellevue, WA 5   
Irvine, CA 4   
San Jose, CA 4   
Las Vegas, NV 4   
Portland, OR 4   
Houston, TX 4   







Figure 1. Location of Videogame Development Studios in the Continental US and the Four 
Largest Concentrations 
 
National map: For purposes of illustrating the concentrations on the national map more 
clearly, those studios that are located within a 50 mile radius of the largest metropolitan 
nearby area are added into that metropolitan area’s total number of studios.  
Regional maps: The four regional maps plot each studio in the region by its exact latitude 
and longitude. 
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